Is Schizophrenia a Disorder of Consciousness? Experimental and Phenomenological Support for Anomalous Unconscious Processing by Giersch, Anne (Anne Giersch (giersch@unistra.fr)) (author) & Mishara, Aaron L. (author)
fpsyg-08-01659 September 26, 2017 Time: 17:47 # 1
HYPOTHESIS AND THEORY
published: 28 September 2017
doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2017.01659
Edited by:
Roumen Kirov,
Institute of Neurobiology (BAS),
Bulgaria
Reviewed by:
Sohee Park,
Vanderbilt University, United States
Assen Veniaminov Jablensky,
University of Western Australia,
Australia
Elena Daprati,
Università degli Studi di Roma Tor
Vergata, Italy
*Correspondence:
Anne Giersch
giersch@unistra.fr
Specialty section:
This article was submitted to
Psychopathology,
a section of the journal
Frontiers in Psychology
Received: 15 May 2017
Accepted: 08 September 2017
Published: 28 September 2017
Citation:
Giersch A and Mishara AL (2017) Is
Schizophrenia a Disorder
of Consciousness? Experimental
and Phenomenological Support
for Anomalous Unconscious
Processing. Front. Psychol. 8:1659.
doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2017.01659
Is Schizophrenia a Disorder of
Consciousness? Experimental and
Phenomenological Support for
Anomalous Unconscious Processing
Anne Giersch1* and Aaron L. Mishara2
1 INSERM U1114, Pôle de Psychiatrie, Fédération de Médecine Translationnelle de Strasbourg, Centre Hospitalier Régional
Universitaire of Strasbourg, Université de Strasbourg, Strasbourg, France, 2 Department of Clinical Psychology, The Chicago
School of Professional Psychology, Los Angeles, CA, United States
Decades ago, several authors have proposed that disorders in automatic processing
lead to intrusive symptoms or abnormal contents in the consciousness of people
with schizophrenia. However, since then, studies have mainly highlighted difficulties in
patients’ conscious experiencing and processing but rarely explored how unconscious
and conscious mechanisms may interact in producing this experience. We report
three lines of research, focusing on the processing of spatial frequencies, unpleasant
information, and time-event structure that suggest that impairments occur at both the
unconscious and conscious level. We argue that focusing on unconscious, physiological
and automatic processing of information in patients, while contrasting that processing
with conscious processing, is a first required step before understanding how distortions
or other impairments emerge at the conscious level. We then indicate that the
phenomenological tradition of psychiatry supports a similar claim and provides a
theoretical framework helping to understand the relationship between the impairments
and clinical symptoms. We base our argument on the presence of disorders in the
minimal self in patients with schizophrenia. The minimal self is tacit and non-verbal and
refers to the sense of bodily presence. We argue this sense is shaped by unconscious
processes, whose alteration may thus affect the feeling of being a unique individual. This
justifies a focus on unconscious mechanisms and a distinction from those associated
with consciousness.
Keywords: implicit processing, unconscious processing, consciousness, schizophrenia, sensory processing,
time, minimal self, self disorders
INTRODUCTION
Schizophrenia is a severe and disabling disorder affecting more than 1% of the population, and
causes tremendous suffering in patients and their families. It is defined on the basis of clinical
symptoms such as hallucinations, delusions, disorganization of thought, apathy and aboulia. It
also includes neurobiological impairments, and cognitive disorders. Nevertheless, these latter
impairments have not been integrated into the diagnosis of schizophrenia. One reason for this
is that it is still unclear to what extent neurobiological and cognitive dysfunction plays a role in
symptoms. A few decades ago, several authors hypothesized that schizophrenia is characterized by a
failure of automatic processing leading to abnormal contents of consciousness (Frith, 1979; Maher,
1983; Venables, 1984; Gray et al., 1991). For example Gray et al. (1991) proposed that alterations
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in the initial stages of information processing allow items
that normally remain unconscious to become conscious in
patients, thus leading to abnormalities at the conscious level.
Research has developed since then along these lines, yielding
several models to account for the clinical symptoms of
disorganization, hallucinations or delusions. Here we argue that
we may deepen our understanding further by more clearly
distinguishing the mechanisms associated with unconscious vs.
conscious information processing. More specifically, after a brief
summary of the state of the art research on these topics, we
summarize recent results that compel us to look more closely
at impairments at an automatic, unconscious level. We justify
this proposal further on the basis of the potential links between
perceptual impairments and what is termed self disorders or
self-disturbances (Ichstörungen).
Cognitive impairments are usually evaluated using
neuropsychological batteries, which assess memory, attention
and related cognitive functions. The cognitive disorders are
found to more or less preexist the clinical pathology, and persist
after the onset of schizophrenia symptoms without any large
variation (Becker et al., 2010; Nuechterlein et al., 2014; Bora
and Murray, 2015; Metzler et al., 2015; Bergh et al., 2016; but
see Zhou et al., 2017). Moreover, they predict the functional
outcome of the patients (Lewandowski et al., 2013; Green, 2016;
Thomas et al., 2017), but it is not clear how they relate with
clinical symptoms. This leads psychiatrists to question whether
cognitive disorders and clinical symptoms are independent
dimensions (Bell and Mishara, 2006; Dominguez Mde et al.,
2009). Despite these findings, many models have been proposed
that provide indirect links between cognitive impairment and
clinical symptoms such as passivity symptoms, hallucinations
(Corlett et al., 2016; Jardri et al., 2016, 2017), delusions (Fletcher
and Frith, 2009) and experiences of influence which includes a
group of symptoms called the self-disturbances or self disorders
(from the German: “Ichstörungen”) in which the conscious
experience of self is affected (Franck et al., 2001; Frith, 2005;
Shergill et al., 2005; Graham-Schmidt et al., 2017; Thakkar et al.,
2017). We argue here that, in addition to existing theoretical
models, there is a range of possible explanations which have
been overlooked or forgotten. We argue that a stronger emphasis
on the processing of information at an automatic level, and its
relationship with mechanisms associated with consciousness,
should be considered. We mainly take examples in the study
of perception, for three main reasons. Perceptual disorders
are observed when the pathology emerges and predict the
conversion to psychosis (Mayer-Gross and Stein, 1928; Mayer-
Gross, 1932; Klosterkötter et al., 2001; Bechdolf et al., 2002).
They are associated with what has been called minimal self
disorders (Mishara, 2007a; Martin et al., 2014; Mishara et al.,
2014; Giersch and Mishara, 2017). Finally, the results of several
studies suggest impairments at the automatic and unconscious
levels (Laprévote et al., 2010, 2013; Lalanne et al., 2012b,c;
Duval et al., 2016), which we in part review here. Perceptual
and low-level sensory anomalies may thus have a stronger role
in the pathophysiology and self disorders of schizophrenia than
usually believed (Mayer-Gross and Stein, 1928; Mayer-Gross,
1932; Sterzer et al., 2016).
The idea that Schizophrenia is a disorder of consciousness
(Frith, 1979; Anscombe, 1987) has attracted considerable interest.
It is not surprising then that many subsequent studies aimed
at investigating mechanisms associated with consciousness. We
certainly do not question the pertinence of these studies that
have expanded our knowledge considerably. In this contribution,
however, we argue that on the basis of a series of recent
experimental results and a long tradition in phenomenological
psychopathology, the automatic, unconscious processing of
sensory information may be more impaired than believed until
now. We further argue that such impairments play a role in
the way patients perceive their environment and themselves, an
approach which in the phenomenological tradition of psychiatry
has been called the “perceptual anomalies” approach (Mayer-
Gross and Stein, 1926, 1928; Mayer-Gross, 1932; Uhlhaas and
Mishara, 2007; Sterzer et al., 2016).
The paucity of studies examining unconscious, automatic
processing in patients with schizophrenia may be due in part to
initial observations that implicit measures of memory suggested
that implicit memory is preserved in patients. By ‘implicit’
memory measures, we mean that instructions to subjects do
not mention what is actually being measured during the task
(Tulving and Schacter, 1990). For example it has been shown
that exposure to words or pictures facilitate their identification
at a subsequent stage (see Roediger and Challis, 1992, for an
in-depth discussion on the mechanisms involved in priming).
In these incidental encoding tasks patients usually benefit from
the initial encoding phase to the same extent as controls (Gras-
Vincendon et al., 1994). Such implicit learning seems to work
well even when the type of information to be encoded is more
complex (Gras-Vincendon et al., 1994; Michel et al., 1998; Danion
et al., 2001b). These studies have been contrasted with those
demonstrating impairments when the tasks require patients to
explicitly retrieve past information (Danion et al., 2007). For
example it has been shown that patients have difficulties in
mentally reliving past events (Danion et al., 2007; Neumann
et al., 2007), building a sense of self identity (Mishara et al.,
2014; Berna et al., 2016a,b), taking prior information into account
to adjust strategies (Danion et al., 2001a) or in interpreting
information (Andreou et al., 2016; Moritz et al., 2016). These
results and others already provide hypotheses regarding self
disorders, especially self disorders as they impact patients’ life-
narratives (Mishara et al., 2014; Berna et al., 2016a,b). This has
led some authors to generalize these results by inferring that
the mechanisms associated with consciousness are selectively
altered in patients (Passerieux et al., 1995; Besche-Richard et al.,
1999). A recent meta-analysis has confirmed that priming is
only minimally impaired in patients with schizophrenia, with
the exception of priming associated with conceptual processes
(Spataro et al., 2016).
The above results have been more recently extended to non-
conscious processing. As a matter of fact implicit processing,
as defined in the above cited studies, refers to the instructions
that are given to the subjects, but do not necessarily mean
that the information that is implicitly encoded is unconscious.
In implicit memory tasks, information is in fact displayed
above threshold and is consciously processed and identified.
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In contrast to the above studies, Del Cul et al. (2006, see
also Charles et al., 2017) compared priming effects when
primes were detectable vs. undetectable. As the memory studies
described above, the patients were impaired at explicitly reporting
information, even though this information influenced their
performance at a non-conscious level in the same way as
the healthy controls. These results once again suggested that
patients mainly have a difficulty with mechanisms associated with
consciousness.
In summary, the studies reviewed above indicate that
patients have difficulty with accessing information consciously.
This confirms the hypothesis that mechanisms associated with
consciousness are impaired in patients with schizophrenia. Still
this account remains only partial, and we ask whether there
is impetus to study the implicit unconscious processing by
using other means. As a matter of fact, similar results have
been observed in patients with multiple sclerosis regarding
conscious access (Reuter et al., 2007, 2009), suggesting the
difficulty in accessing information consciously is shared by
several pathologies. This would fit with the idea that cognitive
disorders are independent from the specific symptomatology
associated with schizophrenia (Dominguez Mde et al., 2009). We
report here that several studies suggest that there are perceptual
impairments that remain largely unexplored in the studies we
cited above.
We present studies below that indicate that spatio-temporal
processing may be distorted in schizophrenia patients on an
implicit, non-conscious level. One reason why we focus on
perceptual experiences in patients is related to the reports of the
patients themselves. As a matter of fact, perceptual abnormalities
or distortions have often been described by patients, and
especially during the prodromal and early stages of schizophrenia
(Mayer-Gross and Stein, 1928; Mayer-Gross, 1932; Conrad,
1958). In fact, perceptual abnormalities in subjects at high risk
for psychosis are one of the main predictors of conversion to
schizophrenia (Klosterkötter et al., 2001; Bechdolf et al., 2002).
These and other descriptions suggest that patients perceptual
experience the world is distorted in these early stages. Moreover,
these distorted perceptual experiences are related to an altered
sense of self (Mishara, 2007a; Martin et al., 2014; Mishara et al.,
2014; Giersch and Mishara, 2017). We refer here to the bodily
self, or minimal self, which is the feeling of being present here
and now (Gallagher, 2000; Stanghellini, 2009; Nelson et al.,
2013). Nevertheless, we contend that the minimal self need not
be consciously processed or experienced to play a role in how
conscious experience is shaped (Mishara, 2010a, 2012). It does,
however, define or demarcate self relative to one’s world. This
requirement does not seem to be fulfilled in patients, who report
a loss of boundaries between themselves and the external world, a
sense of depersonalization, and out-of body experiences (Parnas
and Handest, 2003).
The following patients self-reports, extracted from Chapman’s
(1966), illustrate the distortions described by patients:
“I have to put things together in my head. If I look at my watch
I see the watch, watchstrap, face, hands and so on, then I have
got to put them together to get it into one piece.”
“It’s all right if it’s just one thing at a time but I am virtually
blind at these times and can’t move properly because there are
so many things coming into my eyes that I don’t know what’s
what. I’m like a robot that somebody else can work but I can’t
work myself. I know what to do but I can’t do it. When I’m in
this state of confusion I can’t relate past experience to what is
happening now. I can’t keep things in mind long enough.”
“When you feel in a trance, you tend to identify yourself
with the other person, but that does not matter for if he
moves you go back into a trance. You are dying from moment
to moment and living from moment to moment and you’re
different each time. You don’t know you’re in it. When I look
at somebody my own personality is in danger. I am undergoing
a transformation and myself is beginning to disappear.”
If clinical descriptions suggest perceptual distortions in
prodromal and later stages, what do the experimental approaches
tell us? As a rule, patients have difficulties in detecting and
reporting sensory signals. For example, when the visibility of a
target stimulus is lowered with a mask, patients need a longer
delay between target and mask to detect the target (Saccuzzo and
Braff, 1981; Green and Walker, 1986; Rund, 1993; Cadenhead
et al., 1998; Butler et al., 2001; Tam and Liu, 2004; Koelkebeck
et al., 2005). When a stimulus is flickering, the patients require
a lower flickering frequency than controls to detect the flicker
(Schwartz and Winstead, 1988). Even in the absence of any
manipulation, patients need a higher stimulus contrast than
controls to detect the presence of a stimulus. Some of these
results have been questioned, especially concerning the effects
of medication (Keri et al., 2002; Sheremata and Chen, 2004),
methodology (Skottun and Skoyles, 2007) or the causal role of
alterations at the retinal level (Silverstein and Rosen, 2015). More
details on paradigms used to explore sensory processing can be
found in Table 1.
Despite some gaps in our knowledge concerning the existence
and mechanisms of sensory processing, the results suggest that
patients with schizophrenia have dim vision in the chronic
stage. Interestingly, the patients also have difficulty at grouping
visual information (Silverstein and Keane, 2011). Recognizing
forms requires several processing stages, among which grouping
plays an important role. In the primary visual cortex, distinct
populations of specialized neurons allow for the extraction of
primitives like orientation, luminance or color. These neurons
have small receptive fields, meaning that visual information is
first processed locally and in parallel. Information belonging to
the same figure must thus be bound together and distinguished
from information belonging to different figures or to background.
These binding processes are necessary to derive and identify
object forms (Boucart et al., 1994). This entails several iterative
processes, however, because visual information is most of the
time ambiguous. The ambiguity can result from various factors,
e.g., dim light, view angle variability, or occlusion by other objects
in the foreground. The resolution of this ambiguity is impaired in
those patients (Silverstein, 2016; Silverstein et al., 2017), who have
significant difficulty in exploring visual information (Obayashi
et al., 2003; Minassian et al., 2005; van Assche and Giersch, 2011).
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TABLE 1 | List of some lines of research aimed at testing early sensory processing impairments.
Exploration method Some (not exhaustive)
references
Targeted mechanisms Comments
Prepulse inhibition (PPI)/accoustic
startle: Reduction of the startle reflex
when the stimulus inducing the startle
(the pulse) is preceded by a ‘prepulse,’
i.e., a weaker sensory stimulus. The
time separation between the pulse can
be shorter than 100 ms.
Swerdlow et al., 2006; Li et al.,
2009; Scholes and Martin-Iverson,
2010; Kohl et al., 2013; Javitt and
Freedman, 2015; Morales-Muñoz
et al., 2016; Vargas et al., 2016
The inhibition of the startle reflex is
supposed to be automatic, especially
for short delays between prepulse and
pulse (<50 ms).
This inhibition is reduced in patients
with schizophrenia. The results are
consistent with the hypothesis of
abnormal and excessive sensory
responses.
– The inhibition might be under
attentional control (Scholes and
Martin-Iverson, 2010).
– The lack of prepulse inhibition is not
specific to schizophrenia (Kohl et al.,
2013).
– Interestingly, the reduction of the
startle reflex is more marked for
intervals <100 ms in patients with
schizophrenia (Swerdlow et al., 2006)
and in first episode psychosis
(Morales-Muñoz et al., 2016).
A relationship with timing needs
checking.
Sensory gating: inhibition of repeated
stimuli. Two clicks are displayed with an
interval of 500 ms, and the
electroencephalographic response to
the second stimulus is reduced relative
to the first one.
Bodatsch et al., 2015; Cromwell
and Atchley, 2015; Javitt and
Freedman, 2015; Morales-Muñoz
et al., 2016
Like for the PPI, the inhibition of the
response to the second click is reduced
in patients with schizophrenia. It is
likewise consistent with the hypothesis
of abnormal and excessive sensory
responses.
– The gating might be sensitive to
cognitive and emotional influences
(Cromwell and Atchley, 2015).
Latent inhibition (LI): The initial exposure
to a stimulus prevents this stimulus to
be associated with an aversive signal
during a subsequent conditioning
procedure.
Gray et al., 1991; Lubow, 2005;
Meyer and Louilot, 2014; Vargas
et al., 2016
The conditioning is not reduced in
patients.
LI might represent a model of selective
attention and memory rather than of
early sensory abnormalities (Lubow,
2005; Meyer and Louilot, 2014).
Unconscious perceptual priming: the
exposure to a stimulus that is made
invisible nonetheless influences the
processing of a subsequent stimulus.
Del Cul et al., 2006; Jahshan et al.,
2012; Kiefer et al., 2013; Langdon
et al., 2013
The unconscious perceptual priming
seems to be preserved, like perceptual
priming in general.
Interestingly, Kiefer et al. (2013)
suggested that the time course of
perceptual priming differs between
patients with schizophrenia and
controls.
Backward masking: the visibility of a
visual target information is decreased
by a ‘mask,’ i.e., another visual
stimulus, when it is displayed right after
the target information, in the location or
close to the location of the target.
Saccuzzo and Braff, 1981; Green
and Walker, 1986; Rund, 1993;
Cadenhead et al., 1998; Butler
et al., 2001; Schechter et al., 2003;
Herzog et al., 2004; Tam and Liu,
2004; Koelkebeck et al., 2005;
Granholm et al., 2009; Jahshan
et al., 2012; Lalanne et al., 2012a
The patients with schizophrenia are
more sensitive than controls to the
effect of the mask and their perception
of the target is altered. The
explanations for the cause of this effect
have been various (magnocellular
deficit, reentrant processing).
– The results on unconscious priming,
as well as those of Herzog et al. (2004)
suggest that masking impairs access to
the conscious perception of the prime,
but leaves early information processing
unimpaired, thus questioning whether
these tasks reveal early processing
impairments (Jahshan et al., 2012).
– The results of Granholm et al. (2009);
and Lalanne et al. (2012a) suggested
that impairments in masking might be
related to difficulties in orienting
attention in time on the target.
We prioritized paradigms that have been related to sensory processing and include unconscious processing or at least implicit processing (i.e., processing that does
not follow an explicit instruction). The only case including pure unconscious processing is unconscious perceptual priming. In all other cases, the information is clearly
perceptible and can be consciously perceived and/or anticipated. For example, even if conditioning is a non-conscious mechanism, the fact that information leading to
conditioning is perceived consciously makes it possible that the processing of conditioning information is modulated by mechanisms associated with consciousness.
Interestingly, many of the experiments exploring these difficulties
relied on the incidental role of grouping factors. For example,
grouping factors like collinearity have been manipulated, since
this factor, i.e., the alignment of contour elements, is one of
the strongest grouping factors (Boucart et al., 1994; Kovács
et al., 1999; Giersch et al., 2000; Shipley and Kellman, 2003).
The results showed that patients are impaired at detecting
forms defined by collinear elements (Silverstein and Keane,
2011). Moreover, many experiments were designed to show an
improvement of performance in patients relative to controls,
thus allowing the authors to exclude a non-specific generalized
deficit as the cause of the patients’ impairments. Already in
the seminal studies, Place and Gilmore (1980) and Wells and
Leventhal (1984) showed that patients with schizophrenia did
not benefit from the organization of lines when counting them,
even though this was the easiest condition for controls. Disorders
in organization mechanisms in patients also allowed them to
be faster than controls in a visual search task, when compared
to a control condition without grouping cues (van Assche and
Giersch, 2011). The possible link between these impairments
and perceptual reports of patients, or symptoms, has been
conceptualized within the framework of two main models.
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One is related to the idea that the contextual modulation of
neuronal firing is impaired in patients (Phillips et al., 2015;
Silverstein, 2016; Silverstein et al., 2017). This impedes patients
from refining information processing to disambiguate visual
signals. As a matter of fact, although we have usually no difficulty
to identify forms, visual information is inherently ambiguous.
For example when forms are partially hidden by foreground
objects, the visible parts can be interpreted in different ways,
e.g., as being separated or as belonging to the same object.
Ambiguous information would initially result in one piece of
information corresponding to many possible solutions (e.g.,
objects). Iterative processing and the progressive integration of
additional information would help to discard possibilities and
finally reach a more accurate interpretation of the information
in healthy subjects. This would involve the modulation of neural
processing at the local level and would be impaired in patients
with schizophrenia. Dim vision and false interpretations might
then result in bizarre perceptions, and even delusions (Uhlhaas
and Mishara, 2007).
Another conceptual model is related to predictive coding
(Friston, 2005, 2008). This model also involves iterative
processing, but this time each possibility issued from information
processing would correspond to an hypothesis, or prediction,
which is compared to the sensory input to check if it matches
or not. Once objects are identified, the same mechanisms can
be used to compare the visual input from moment to moment
and to detect changes. If information stays the same, it is
considered as non-pertinent and canceled, whereas a detection
of a change is considered as pertinent and attracts attention.
Many studies have suggested these mechanisms are impaired
in schizophrenia (Gray et al., 1991; Friston and Frith, 2015;
Sterzer et al., 2016; Corlett, 2017; Griffin and Fletcher, 2017).
This impairment results in a difficulty to detect changes in
perceptual information. This might lead to something similar
as contextual modulation, i.e., dim vision. Both models explain
bizarre perception by the emergence of aberrant information,
related to a confusion between pertinent and non-pertinent
information, or to erratic contextual modulation or grouping.
Why and when aberrant contextual grouping or prediction errors
occur is unclear, however. Patients with schizophrenia are not
always impaired at grouping stimuli (van Assche and Giersch,
2011). They can sometimes use prediction errors efficiently
(Delevoye-Turrell et al., 2002, 2003; Knoblich et al., 2004). It
can even happen that they suffer more from unpredictability
and irregularity than from regularity (Horacek et al., 2016),
as if they would be more rather than less sensitive to
change. These inconsistencies suggest that a closer look at
the mechanisms underlying these impairments is warranted.
If one were merely to consider the literature reviewed at
the beginning of our contribution, then it is easy to see
how such findings could have been related to the hypothesis
of impaired conscious processing relative to more intact
automatic, unconscious processing. Recent results challenge
this assumption, however, and suggest that impairments at the
automatic and unconscious levels should be explored more
closely. They may help to reconcile some inconsistencies in the
literature.
FIRST SERIES OF RESULTS: LOW
SPATIAL FREQUENCY PROCESSING
The first series of results concern contrast sensitivity. The
evaluation of contrast sensitivity consists in displaying sinusoidal
gratings, i.e., stimuli composed of alternating black and white
bands, the contrast of which varies according to a sinusoidal
law. Subjects are asked to detect the presence of the grating. The
manipulation of the contrast between dark and light bars makes
the grating more or less visible, and allows for the evaluation
of a detection threshold. This threshold varies according to
the spatial frequency composition of the gratings. Low spatial
frequencies convey global information and correspond to dark
and white bars that are distant in space, whereas high spatial
frequencies convey detail information and correspond to dark
and white bars that are close in space. As noted above, results
usually suggest that patients with schizophrenia have decreased
contrast sensitivity. This deficit is usually more marked when
the stimuli are composed of low spatial frequencies (Butler
et al., 2001; Jahshan et al., 2017). However, studies exploring
the perception of spatial frequencies in an incidental way found
the opposite result. Laprévote et al. (2010, 2013) first filtered
stimuli, and obtained thus pictures with either high or low spatial
frequencies. The authors then created hybrid pictures, which are
composed of one stimulus with low spatial frequencies and one
with high spatial frequencies (Schyns and Oliva, 1994, 1999).
They applied this procedure to faces, while the high and low
spatial frequencies faces composing the stimulus had different
expressions. With this procedure, the type of expression that is
perceived by the subject tells which spatial frequencies he/she
perceives preferentially. This paradigm was applied to patients
with schizophrenia, and the results show, in two distinct studies
(Laprévote et al., 2010, 2013), that patients preferentially perceive
the low spatial frequency contents. This might suggest that results
observed with incidental procedures do not necessarily match
those observed when patients are more directly asked to make
a perceptual judgment. This hypothesis remains to be checked,
though, especially as the results for conscious and unconscious
processing were obtained in different groups of patients. This
objection does not hold for the two following examples, though,
which were obtained within the same groups of patients.
SECOND SERIES OF RESULTS: EEG
RESPONSES TO UNPLEASANT
STIMULATIONS
Patients with schizophrenia are frequently thought to have
reduced sensitivity to pain and to emotional stimuli generally,
which has been thought to be related to anhedonia (Kring
and Moran, 2008). For emotion, however, recent studies rather
suggest that patients experience emotions in a similar manner
to controls, but cannot control them (Kring and Moran, 2008;
Cohen and Minor, 2010; Horan et al., 2013). As with perception,
a majority of studies relies on the subjective report of patients.
Nonetheless, the results suggest that patients report emotional
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experiences similarly to those reported by healthy controls (Kring
and Moran, 2008). Some studies also use physiological measures
of emotional experiences, e.g., skin conductance or heart beat
(Venables and Wing, 1962; Kring and Neale, 1996; Hempel et al.,
2005, 2007). Although results are somewhat mixed a number
of results have suggested that physiological responses may be
even larger in amplitude in patients with schizophrenia than
in controls (Kring and Moran, 2008). Here again there might
be a contrast between the automatic physiological response to
emotion, and the subjective report. Such a contrast has also
been found with unpleasant, electrical stimulations. There is
less studies on pain than on emotion, and here again most of
them rely on the subjective responses of the subjects after a
stimulation. We will not review the data helping to determine
which mechanisms associated to pain processing are impaired
in patients with schizophrenia (see, e.g., Bonnot et al., 2009;
Lévesque et al., 2012; Engels et al., 2014; Stubbs et al., 2015), but
will focus on one study suggesting heightened responses at a non-
conscious level when no alteration is evidenced at a conscious
level. Duval et al. (2016) used both electrical stimulations right
below pain threshold and pictures with a negative emotional
content. Subjects were asked to rate the intensity and unpleasant
character of the stimuli subjectively, while EEG was recorded
continuously. There was no difference between groups on
subjective ratings, neither for electrical stimulations nor for
pictures with a negative emotional content. However, EEG
recording showed heightened physiological responses for both
types of stimuli. Patients displayed early EEG responses 50 ms
after electrical stimulations, whose amplitude was larger than
in controls. EEG responses after pictures with an emotional
content were also heightened in patients, at around 1 s after
the picture display. The results as a whole again suggest that
automatic responses can be altered in patients with schizophrenia
without this leading to observable abnormalities at a conscious
level. Moreover these alterations at an automatic level are not
necessarily congruent with disorders at a conscious level. As a
matter of fact heightened sensitivity to pain is rarely observed
in patients with schizophrenia (but see Girard et al., 2011).
All in all these abnormalities remind us of the heightened
sensitivity to sensory information in subjects at risk of developing
schizophrenia (Mayer-Gross and Stein, 1928; Mayer-Gross, 1932;
Klosterkötter et al., 2001; Bechdolf et al., 2002). This heightened
sensitivity would, however, be observable only at an unconscious
level in patients with chronic schizophrenia. The third example is
also consistent with this hypothesis.
THIRD SERIES OF RESULTS: TIME
PROCESSING
We have seen in the first example that patients have difficulties
in organizing visual information in space, with an attendant
fragmentation of information. Phenomenological approaches
lead to similar observations about time (Fuchs, 2007, 2013;
Vogeley and Kupke, 2007; Mishara, 2010b). Experimental
psychology methods confirm that conscious experience is
structured in time (van Wassenhove, 2009; Wittmann, 2011;
Elliott and Giersch, 2016). Information that occurs within
windows of 20–50 ms (in monosensory conditions) is judged to
be simultaneous, and temporal simultaneity can help to group
information together (Kandil and Fahle, 2004). On the other
hand, asynchrony would help to distinguish successive events
from one another, and to order them. Perceived asynchronies
would thus be fundamental for organizing events in time. The
succession of events and the relationships that are established
between events also contribute to the sense of time continuity,
which has been reported to be altered in patients with
schizophrenia (Fuchs, 2007, 2013; Vogeley and Kupke, 2007).
Given the potential importance of time event-structure in the
ability to organize events in time and the sense of time continuity,
it seemed clinically relevant to check the ability of patients with
schizophrenia to distinguish sensory stimuli in time. In these
studies, two visual squares are typically shown on a computer
screen, each in a different location, and subjects determine
whether the two stimuli are simultaneous or asynchronous
(analog studies are also conducted in the auditory modality).
Subjects give their response by pressing on one side in case
the stimuli are simultaneous, and on the other side in case
they are asynchronous. Several studies have now established that
patients are impaired in time discrimination, and need larger
delays between stimuli to distinguish them in time (Foucher et al.,
2007; Giersch et al., 2009; Schmidt et al., 2011). In addition,
these results have been shown to be independent of trivial effects
such as an attention or bias effect (Giersch et al., 2009; Lalanne
et al., 2012c). What is especially relevant regarding the present
argumentation, however, is the contrast between this difficulty
at a conscious level, and the impairments evidenced at a non-
conscious level.
We have indeed repeatedly shown that even when two stimuli
are judged to be simultaneous, they are nonetheless automatically
distinguished and followed in time (Lalanne et al., 2012b,c;
Poncelet and Giersch, 2015). The Simon effect can be used to
indicate that this automatic processing has taken place. The
Simon effect refers to the fact that subjects tend to answer on
the side of the stimulus whatever the task demands may require
(Simon, 1969). For example, if subjects have to discriminate
forms, e.g., circles and squares, and if they are instructed to
press on the right side for circles, they will nonetheless tend
to press on the left side if the circle is displayed on the left
side. When two stimuli are shown on the screen, as in the
simultaneity/asynchrony discrimination task, the Simon effect
cannot be applied directly. If information is perfectly symmetrical
on the screen, there cannot be any Simon effect. An asymmetry
can be observed in case of an asynchrony, though, and such a
temporal asymmetry has indeed been shown to induce a Simon-
like effect (Lalanne et al., 2012b,c). Healthy subjects were shown
to have a bias to press to the side of the second square in all
cases, and this effect was interpreted subsequently as indexing
the ability of subjects to follow stimuli over time. As a matter of
fact, by the time the subjects gave their response, the attention of
the subjects was on the location of the last stimulus (see Poncelet
and Giersch, 2015 for more detailed experimental evidence).
Patients with schizophrenia were shown to have biases similar to
controls when the asynchronies were visible (i.e., above 50 ms).
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FIGURE 1 | Illustration of Simon effect used to evaluate the non-conscious
processing of information in time. The two stimuli displayed on the screen
were separated by a variable stimulus onset asynchrony. Subjects decided
whether the two stimuli were simultaneous or asynchronous and gave their
response on the left side or on the right accordingly. When asynchronies were
shorter than 20 ms and simultaneity ratings were identical to those observed
witth synchronous stimuli, healthy subjects nonetheless tended to press to the
side of the 2nd occuring square, whereas patients tended to press to the side
of the 1st square.
The critical results were observed when asynchronies were not
perceptible. Patients showed a Simon effect even for asynchronies
as short as 8 and 17 ms (Giersch et al., 2015). This shows that they
distinguish information in time better than what was suggested
from their subjective responses. Most importantly, however, for
the present discussion, the Simon effect was opposite to the
one evidenced in the controls. Whereas controls tended to press
to the side of the second square even for stimuli separated
by a short delay (i.e., 17 ms), the patients tended to press to
the side of the first stimulus (Figure 1). Hence, in contrast
with healthy subjects, who would be able to follow stimuli
over time and displace their attention toward the most recently
occurring stimulus, patients appeared to be “stuck” with the first
stimulus.
It was argued that these results reveal a difficulty of the
patients with schizophrenia to anticipate and follow information
over time smoothly. Anticipation was evoked due to the very
short delay between stimuli onsets (Giersch et al., 2016). This
short asynchrony makes it difficult for subjects to initiate an
attention displacement from the first to second stimuli once
the first stimulus has been displayed. The first stimulus requires
some time no matter how brief to be processed (Scharnowski
et al., 2009; Herzog et al., 2016). There is thus a risk that the
onset of the second stimulus is missed. To avoid this risk, the
two stimuli can be attended for in advance. This is likely the
case during an experiment in which subjects are instructed to
judge about the simultaneity or asynchrony of the two stimuli
on each trial. More recent data confirms the fragility of time
anticipation in patients with schizophrenia (Giersch et al., 2017;
Martin et al., 2017). The fact that anticipation mechanisms are
altered in patients with schizophrenia can explain why they
appear to be stuck with the first stimulus and is consistent
with phenomenological hypotheses (Martin et al., 2014; Giersch
and Mishara, 2017), as developed below. In this third example,
patients with schizophrenia once again display impairments at a
non-conscious, automatic level that differ from the impairments
at the conscious level.
Since these impairments affect mechanisms that are not
accessible to consciousness or introspection, it may be tempting
to simply dismiss them. It is thus legitimate to ask how the
impairments affect the conscious experience of the patients.
In doing so, we should be reminded how much unconscious
mechanisms shape our experience of the world. Above, we
briefly described the mechanisms involved in the recognition of
objects. Most of these mechanisms are unconscious. We are not
aware that specialized information is extracted at the level of
the primary visual cortex, and that this information has to be
bound together in order for objects to be identified. Nonetheless,
an impairment of these mechanisms can lead to visual agnosia,
whereby patients have difficulties recognizing objects. It can be
stressed here that patients with visual agnosia are unable to
clearly convey what they see. For example, HJA is a patient who
suffered from visual agnosia (Giersch et al., 2000). Extensive
exploration allowed researchers to infer that he suffered from
an impairment in binding information together (Humphreys
and Riddoch, 1987). However, despite coming regularly to the
laboratory and receiving extensive information about the results
of the tests, HJA was unable to describe what he saw. This means
that if patients with schizophrenia suffer from an impairment
of the unconscious mechanisms associated with anticipation and
temporal structure-event coding, it is likely that they are unable
to clearly describe what they experience. Moreover, a difficulty
in organizing information in time properly can be expected to
disrupt subjective experience. The dialog with phenomenology is
helpful here to conceptualize how impairments at an automatic
level can disrupt the conscious experience of patients. In the
following section, we give a brief example of how impairments
in the automatic processing of information in time might fit with
and complement existing models of perceptual impairments in
patients with schizophrenia and phenomenological analysis.
IMPAIRMENTS OF TIME-EVENT
STRUCTURE CODING AT AN
AUTOMATIC AND AT A SUBJECTIVE
LEVEL: PHENOMENOLOGICAL AND
CLINICAL MEANING
The impairments described above are not inconsistent with the
models cited above, i.e., neural modulation or predictive coding.
We have seen that fragmentation in space has been related
with clinical disorganization, and this might be also the case
for fragmentation in time. Besides it has been argued that the
anticipation of future events is congruent with predictive coding
(Lalanne et al., 2012b; Tschacher et al., 2017). The models of
neural modulation or predictive coding can be applied at any level
of processing, both unconscious and conscious. Yet, this should
not prevent us from distinguishing unconscious and conscious
processing. The heightened weight of low spatial frequencies, the
abnormal increase of the physiological responses in case of an
electrical stimulation, or the high temporal accuracy at a non-
conscious level, contrast with dim or blurred responses at a
conscious level. The heightened responses and the fragmentation
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of information processing at a non-conscious level may reflect
alterations starting from the onset of information processing.
These alterations might distort the perceptual experience at its
core, and induce a strangeness or other anomalous experiences
in conscious experience that might be difficult to report.
It is when trying to derive the consequences of disorders in the
automatic processing of information on the subjective experience
of patients that the dialog with phenomenology can contribute.
We illustrate this point with the example of time impairment.
We have proposed elsewhere that time impairments might play
a more fundamental role in the structure of consciousness. As
already stressed by philosophers (Husserl, 1991), time continuity
is inherent to subjective experience. Time flows and seems
resistant to any efforts to stop it. The fact that there are no
experienced gaps in our subjective experience of time continuity
makes such continuity seem to be a given fact, which we
generally do not question. Moreover, the obligatory flow time
as irreducible ‘fact’ contributes to our sense of being a unique
individual, who experiences continuity over time. Conversely,
the disruption of the feeling of continuity might impair the
feeling of being one unique individual. This disruption has often
been described at a phenomenological level in patients with
schizophrenia (Fuchs, 2007, 2013; Vogeley and Kupke, 2007).
We have argued that impairments in time discrimination at
an automatic level might contribute to the disruption of time
continuity and thus result in disturbances of minimal self (Martin
et al., 2014; Giersch and Mishara, 2017). Importantly, we argue
that it might be misleading to focus on the impairments at the
subjectively conscious level while ignoring those at the automatic
level. A difficulty in predicting and following information at an
unconscious level at the very brief time scales described above
may represent an elementary mechanism at the root of the sense
of time continuity. This sense is too robust to rely exclusively
on the ability to consciously relate events with one another.
We have proposed that the automatic mechanisms enabling
events to be both distinguished and followed over time may
play a major role in the sense of time continuity. It follows
that the non-conscious impairments in temporal organization in
the patients should alter the patients’ experiences. In patients,
an excess of information would be processed at an unconscious
level without being integrated in the flow of consciousness,
and would contribute to the strangeness or other anomalous
experiences of the conscious experience in patients. Such an
impact of unconscious mechanisms on the conscious experience
has also been explored in phenomenology, and supports this
hypothesis. The phenomenological approach on this question
is briefly summarized in the following section. This will enable
us to go back to the experimental data now informed by
the phenomenology and not only discuss how it leads to an
adaptation of existing models but also to new questions.
THE PHENOMENOLOGICAL APPROACH
TO SCHIZOPHRENIA SUGGESTS AN
IMPLICIT TIMING DEFICIT
Founded by the mathematician turned philosopher, Edmund
Husserl (1859–1938), phenomenology is the rigorous, methodical
description of conscious experience. Phenomenology can be
applied to study general mental structures in human experience
and how these are disrupted in neuropsychiatric disorders. It
is well-known that phenomenology studies consciousness, i.e.,
what appears as given in consciousness. What is less well-known
is that it also studies the unconscious automatic processing
which plays a decisive role in the organization of conscious
experience (Mishara, 1990; Wiggins, 1994; Wiggins and Spitzer,
1997). As such, phenomenology stands in an excellent position
to bring the experimental data concerning the disruption of
implicit processing in schizophrenia together with the often
bizarre symptoms of psychosis, such as the self-disturbances or
self disorders (from the German: “Ichstörungen”). It is beyond
the scope of the present paper to discuss the current debates
in phenomenology on how minimal self is best characterized
and how it is accessed by phenomenological method (Mishara,
2007a,b, 2010b; Zahavi, 2007; Parnas et al., 2008; Mishara et al.,
2014; Sterzer et al., 2016). What we will discuss here is how
disorders in the temporal organization of unconscious and
conscious processing can alter a sense of minimal self, and
to which extent phenomenology and experimental psychology
provide arguments in favor of this hypothesis.
Giersch et al. (2013) propose that a basic disturbance in
temporal coding may play a role in the perceptual anomalies, e.g.,
visual perception, in schizophrenia. Here the phenomenological
approach to automatic processing may bring together: (1) the
experimental data of patients with schizophrenia who are unable
to follow events in time at an implicit level, (2) the extended
temporal windows of what is experienced as simultaneous and
the patient’s experience of fragmentation of the normal flow of
events (Giersch and Mishara, 2017).
The phenomenological psychiatrist, Binswanger (1957) made
use of the phenomenological approach to study automatic
processing (called genetic phenomenology) in his analyses
of self and schizophrenia. He proposed that psychosis
itself is a “natural experiment” in which “deeper,” otherwise
inaccessible unconscious levels of processing are exposed. The
phenomenology of automatic processing involves the systematic
removing of phases of complete-objects in their constitutive
meaning, starting with the most conscious ones first – as if
peeling the layers of an onion – to see what layers remain
underneath. These layers, or genetic phases become separated
‘abstractly’ in reflection, but may not be said to ‘exist’ on their
own. Husserl (1966) described the implicit automatic processes
of passive synthesis as a self-organizing system (Mishara, 2012).
Another group of phenomenological psychiatrists in the early
20th century, the early Heidelberg School (Gruhle, Mayer-
Gross, Beringer) first named and defined the self-disturbances
(from German: “Ichstörungen”) and used mescaline as a
model-psychosis in healthy individuals to explore the possible
mechanisms of the self-disturbances (Mishara et al., 2016; Sterzer
et al., 2016). This approach anticipated Hemsley and Gray’s
observation of a failure to make use of stored material. As
indicated above, Gray et al. (1991) and Hemsley (1994) proposed
that the “core cognitive disturbance” of schizophrenia may be
an inability to make use of stored material in the processing
of current input. Gray (1998) observes there is an “excess of
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conscious, controlled processing relative to normal individuals”
(Gray, 1998, p. 259) due to a failure of redundant information
to become automatic which impedes the goal directedness of a
limited capacity and slower controlled processing system.
The Heidelberg group observed that when healthy individuals
were experiencing mescaline intoxication, they reported
experiences very close to the psychotic patients. Their
relationship to past experiences was profoundly modified:
the past did not seem to contribute to shaping present experience
and goals. One participant stated, “Everything which I see is
different, isolated, without any relationship to what has happened
in the past.” Another states: “I experience increasing difficulty to
implement my impulses into goals and movement.” That is, the
current experience is so new and compelling, there is a loss of
relationship to past and future. Another subject states: “During
the experiment, I happened to receive a letter of considerable
importance and opportunity. I read it with complete indifference
without feeling or reaction. The whole thing appeared to me to
be meaningless, as if it belonged to some past time” (Mishara
et al., 2016).
Moreover, the Heidelberg findings suggested novel underlying
mechanisms for the bizarre psychotic experiences of the self-
disturbances, where perceptions, movements, cognitions,
emotions occur independently from the self ’s volition.
Perceiving, moving, speaking, thinking, feeling and willing are
normally supported by unconscious, automatic processes, which
are thus largely ignored. In the self-disturbances, automatic
processes are dissociated from self, and thus experienced as
not under the patient’s control (Mishara et al., 2016; Sterzer
et al., 2016). This does not mean that the automatic processing
itself becomes conscious. This is especially the case when the
automatic processing involved occurs on such small time scales
that it cannot possibly become conscious as in the experiments
described above.
In the self-disturbances of schizophrenia, where one’s own
automatic processing appears to function independently from self
or its volition, there would rather be a disconnection between
conscious experience of self and automatic processing. This
means the automatic processing is experienced as acting on its
own which is reported as very disturbing for patients with self-
disturbances (Uhlhaas and Mishara, 2007; Mishara et al., 2016;
Sterzer et al., 2016). In other words, the psychotic experience of
self-disturbances may rest on abnormalities of the coordination
of timing between conscious and non-conscious processing. The
disconnection of automatic processing from attendant conscious
experience can then be experienced as intrusions in the sense that
phenomena enter consciousness due to the lack of coordination
in time between automatic and conscious controlled processing.
For example thought insertion, thought withdrawal, experiences
of influence in all domains (perceiving, moving, speaking,
thinking, feeling, and willing), appear as being detached from the
patient’s conscious controlled processing. This experienced lack
of control makes the patients own embodied processing seem
alien and influenced by alien agency.
Mayer-Gross is the herald of what later came to be known as
the “perceptual anomalies” approach to the positive symptoms of
schizophrenia, the view that low-level perceptual anomalies play a
critical role in the positive symptoms of schizophrenia, including
the self-disturbances. The phenomenological psychiatrists
Matussek, Conrad and Binswanger later developed this view (for
reviews see Uhlhaas and Mishara, 2007; Mishara, 2012; Mishara
and Fusar-Poli, 2013). In his phenomenological analysis of the
loss of common sense in schizophrenia, Blankenburg arrives at
similar conclusions. As Blankenburg (1969/2001) observes, our
mental health is preserved thanks to a certain “resistance” to
losing our common sense. This resistance functions precisely
by ignoring what is obvious, which does not require further
exploration; it even “resists” further exploration. But once this
resistance is lost, its absence is painfully salient. A patient states,
“What is it that I am missing? It is something so small, but
strange, it is something so important. It is impossible to live
without it. . .”. Blankenburg (1969/2001) continues, “Not only is
the patient pained to have lost something which seems to be very
small but she must also suffer that the rest of us barely appreciate
this essential component of our experience and have the greatest
difficulty to empathize with what it would be like not to have it.”
Blankenburg (1969/2001) writes, “The healthiness of common
sense rests on habituality. The natural self-evidence of everyday
existence draws its nourishment from just such a habituality.”
Blankenburg observes that common sense rests on judgments
of the probable rather than what we can directly ascertain as true.
If one demands certitude in the proper domain of the merely
probable (as in Blankenburg’ s patient attempting to select a
dress for a special occasion), then one attempts to construct
with controlled effortful processing what is available to others
as a matter of “subtlety of feeling, i.e., what is intersubjectively
acceptable but not accessible to direct rational analysis. . .”.
This is consistent with the fact that automatic processing is
impaired and must be compensated for by conscious processing.
Moreover it shows how the disconnection between unconscious
and conscious processing may lead to the strange self-reports of
patients, and contribute to disturbances of the minimal self.
Earlier, we suggested that the minimal self (the non-verbal
sense of own bodily presence) is compromised in schizophrenia.
The minimal self is in part defined by temporal structure which
need not be conscious. Moreover, the role of temporal structure
in the experience of bodily presence (one’s own and others’)
is shaped by unconscious processes, whose alteration may thus
affect the feeling of being a unique individual.
This is suggested by Husserl’s own phenomenological analyses
of the experience of time. In these analyses, Husserl observed a
fundamental paradox in how we experience time. Time is both
“streaming” (the experience of subjective flow) and “standing”
(we are always in a current now). Husserl was particularly
disturbed by this paradox, and found it to be a central enigma
not only to how we experience time but also self. How could
the experience of subjective time be composed of two apparently
contradictory elements: a streaming and a standing in the
streaming? Yet without these two elements there would be no
experience of time?
The German phenomenological philosopher, Held (1966)
comments on Husserl’s dilemma: “it is possible to lead the enigma
of the living present back to a fundamental problem: the non-
experiencability of the full unity of standing and streaming”
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(our translation). Citing Husserl: “The functioning I leads
continuously into its own horizons of the past and future because
it itself is what in the transitioning remains standing” (Das ich
fungiere leitet in sich kontinuerlich in seine Vergangenheits- und
Zukunftshoirzonte ueber, weil es selbst in stehen uebergaengig
ist).
Husserl identifies the standing in the streaming as the self: The
standing (persistent, self-transcending) “I” continuously emerges
as invariant structure of time: the streaming itself. The I is
the temporal structure of streaming (that it is a totality which
I do not simultaneously grasp but only live as a “letting be”
of the flowing itself -“urpassive Enstroemen-Lassen”-). That is
the self only preserves itself by the letting be of the obligatory
flow to which it is subjected. The originally passive streaming
(i.e., without participation of the I) is given in advance in a
manner that remains puzzling [raetselhafte Vorgebenheit des
urpassiven Stroemens (Held, 1966, p. 102)]. But just as the
passive, obligatory streaming of time seems given in advance
so is the self or I as what stands or remains the same in the
streaming. Held (1966) cites a manuscript by Husserl: The stream
is always ahead but the I is also ahead (Das Stroemen ist immerzu
im Voraus; aber auch das Ich ist im Voraus) (Ms. C 17, IV
S 5ff, 1932, our translation). That is, the streaming can only
be experienced by an «I» who somehow remains preserved.
Conversely, the I only preserves itself by letting itself go in an
ongoing process of self-displacement, a giving way to its own
division (Entzweiung) in which the current I recalls the just past
I as now its double in an ongoing process of self-regeneration.
At the center of the self ’s nunc stans is a submitting to its own
transcending.
Following Mayer-Gross and Stein (1928) and Mayer-Gross’
(1932) view that low-level perceptual anomalies play a critical role
in generating the positive symptoms of schizophrenia, including
the self-disturbances, we suggest here that anomalies in very
early stages in the temporal ordering of sensory processing
already at very brief time scales (as examined in the above
experiments) may also contribute to the self-disturbances and
related symptoms. Such anomalies could disrupt the experience
of self in time. The I as what is preserved in the momentary
transitions from moment to moment is based on the original
unity between standing and streaming of the living present now
(Held, 1966). To the extent that one or the other of the mutually
interdependent components standing and streaming is disrupted
it will lead to a disruption of its complement. This very much
fits in with early Heidelberg School (Beringer, 1927; Mayer-Gross
and Stein, 1928; Mayer-Gross, 1932) phenomenological study of
the model psychoses of the self-disturbances (Mishara et al., 2016;
Sterzer et al., 2016). For example, the Heidelberg participants
reported “Movements are experienced as abnormally slow or
not seen at all: the movement of my hand is only experienced
at its beginning and end positions. Conversely, movements are
exaggerated, seen as abnormally fast, resting objects are seen
as moving. My movements appear to me as artificial, foreign,
like an automaton.” With regard to the distortions of time and
space in the model psychoses of the self-disturbances, subjects
reported: “I could not envision future or past. I lived entirely
in the present, and even that in an entirely thin slice. Time
slows down, coming to a complete standstill with a sense of
timelessness, or conversely, starts to speed up. When time
stands still, there is loss of sense of movement and space”
(Mishara et al., 2016). We have examined elsewhere how these
phenomenological findings are consistent to predictive coding
accounts of positive symptoms in schizophrenia, including the
self-disturbances (Sterzer et al., 2016; Giersch and Mishara,
2017).
INTEGRATING EXPERIMENTAL AND
PHENOMENOLOGICAL APPROACHES:
TOWARD A NEW MODEL?
The phenomenological approach emphasizes both the
disconnection but also the relationship between unconscious and
conscious processing in an emergent self-organizing field. The
dissociation is also supported by the experimental data. In the
following, we illustrate why this dissociation is important and
should encourage more careful examination and experiments
to examine unconscious processing and its relationship with
conscious processing. We develop this point by speculating on
the possible consequences of the dissociation based on timing
data. It is often assumed that the main difference between
conscious and unconscious levels is the existence or lack of
conscious realization. Models of consciousness are indeed a way
to resolve the question of consciousness access (Baars, 1989;
Crick and Koch, 1995; Tononi and Edelman, 1998; Lamme and
Roelfsema, 2000; Changeux and Dehaene, 2008). However, many
unconscious mechanisms never reach consciousness. Moreover,
our data suggest that some mechanisms of integration may
be selectively associated with consciousness, thus implying a
qualitative change in consciousness relative to the unconscious
level. In other words we have to understand not only how
FIGURE 2 | Illustration of the model derived from the hypothesis of a
dissociation between the processing of information at the unconscious and
conscious levels. Information would be ordered only at the conscious level
(involving the parietal cortex –Battelli et al., 2007; Davis et al., 2009; Binder,
2015), requiring a time coordination between the processing at the
unconscious and conscious levels. Inasmuch this coordination would involve
predictive mechanisms at the level of the ms, it points toward an interaction
between cerebellum and the frontal cortex (Andreasen, 1999; Giersch et al.,
2016).
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information becomes conscious, but also what additional
information or factors enter at the conscious relative to the
unconscious levels. In particular, we have argued elsewhere
(Giersch et al., 2013) that it is unlikely that all information is
automatically compared and ordered relative to one another
in time, due to a problem of exponential combinatory cost in
crowded environments. In addition, it can be questioned if the
Simon effect observed at sub-threshold asynchronies reflects a
processing of time order (inasmuch it reflects a bias to give a
motor response to the side of the second event in a sequence
of two). If it was, we would have expected that the order
of the stimuli (right-left or left-right) is encoded even when
presented at subthreshold asynchronies (<20 ms). This should
have facilitated the processing of a subsequent sequence of stimuli
when these stimuli are presented in the same order (for example
1st sequence right-left and 2nd right-left). This was not the
case, however (Poncelet and Giersch, 2015). On the contrary the
processing of the 2nd sequence of stimuli was facilitated when
it was in the opposite direction relative to the 1st sequence.
The Simon effect thus allows us to attend to the last occurring
information without necessarily coding the order relationship
between successive information. The Simon effect appears to
reflect a mechanism allowing us to stay connected with the
flow of information rather than to order information. If this
is true, ordering information might be a property selectively
associated with consciousness. It follows that the dissociation
between unconscious and conscious mechanisms would require
coordination between these mechanisms. The ability to predict
and follow information more accurately at the unconscious
than the conscious level would help to embed unconscious
mechanisms within conscious temporal sequences. Reversely,
the processing of order associated with consciousness might
be used to adjust automatic and unconscious mechanisms so
that they fit together in time. For example, when the aim is
to orient one’s attention, automatic mechanisms have to fit in
time with the attention sequence. This hypothesis is illustrated
in Figure 2. The impairment of this interaction might explain
the dissociation between unconscious and conscious processing
described in phenomenology in patients with schizophrenia.
Such a hypothesis may reconcile the models of contextual
modulation and predictive coding, by introducing the question
of temporal coherence between different levels of processing.
The contextual modulation would require a temporal alignment
of automatic sensory mechanisms on the temporal ordering
sequences at a conscious level. If automatic and conscious
processing are not coordinated, it may contribute to defective
contextual modulation and blurred or dim vision. It may also
imply that the content of sensory information cannot be properly
compared to prior expectations. As a matter of fact, time
coordination may require the prediction of sequences of sensory
events in advance in order to coordinate all the mechanisms
involved in information processing. We have already proposed
that prediction mechanisms at the ms level are impaired
in patients with schizophrenia (Giersch et al., 2016), which
may be consistent with the cognitive dysmetria hypothesis of
Andreasen (1999). This impairment might result in items not
being properly integrated in time, and thus emerging abnormally
at the conscious level, as proposed by Gray (1998). However,
the function of the prediction we propose here differs from
the other models (without excluding them). Its main function
would be to time and coordinate unconscious and conscious
mechanisms, rather than including an expectation regarding
the content of the sensory information. It remains to be
seen whether the neurophysiological mechanisms associated
with consciousness are involved in this coordination, which
would enable further integration with neuronal connectivity
and associated genetic results in this model (Uhlhaas and
Singer, 2010; Balu and Coyle, 2011; Gurung and Prata, 2015;
Martino et al., 2017; Romme et al., 2017). A link between
neurobiological impairments and minimal self disorders has
already been proposed by some authors (Mishara et al.,
2016; Northoff and Duncan, 2016; Northoff, 2017). Our
proposal here adds possible explanations at the functional
level.
All in all, this proposal is not incompatible with previous
models, but provides testable hypotheses on specific timing
mechanisms. Its originality is to contrast unconscious and
conscious processing. If it is confirmed that some mechanisms are
specifically associated with conscious processing, it will require us
to re-consider how information is processed unconsciously and
how it is coordinated with conscious processing. This might shed
new light on the patients’ impairments, as tentatively developed
here.
CONCLUSION
In summary, recent experimental evidence suggests contrasting
impairments of unconscious and conscious sensory processing.
The heightened responses to unpleasant information, or the
abnormalities in time processing, contrast with the perception
at the conscious level, which is noisy and dim. This contrast may
contribute to a disconnection between automatic and conscious
processing. In this sense the results help to reconnect with
the hypotheses that had been put forward years ago, and that
explain the loss of natural evidence that characterize the distorted
experience of patients (Blankenburg, 1971, Blankenburg,
1969/2001) and may underlie their self-disturbances.
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